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This article is a supplement to our recent one about the analysis of the noise properties in the Kirch-
hoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system [Gingl and Mingesz, PLOS ONE 9 
(2014) e96109, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0096109]. Here we use purely mathematical statistical der-
ivations to prove that only normal distribution with special scaling can guarantee security. Our re-
sults are in agreement with earlier physical assumptions [Kish, Phys. Lett. A 352 (2006) 178-182, 
doi: 10.1016/j.physleta.2005.11.062]. Furthermore, we have carried out numerical simulations to 
show that the communication is clearly unsecure for improper selection of the noise properties. Pro-
tection against attacks using time and correlation analysis is not considered in this paper. Related 
simulations are available at www.noise.inf.u-szeged.hu/Research/kljn/. 
Keywords: KLJN; secure key exchange; unconditionally secure communication; secure key distribu-
tion; noise  
1. Introduction 
At present the security of the communication is mostly provided by software-based cryp-
tographic solutions. Since the security is ensured only by the assumption that the eaves-
dropper does not have enough processing capability to break the code, considerable ef-
forts have been made to develop unconditionally secure communication protocols. One 
promising research area is the quantum encryption, where security is based on the laws of 
quantum mechanics. However, recently an alternative communication scheme has been 
proposed, the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) protocol, which is based only on 
the laws of classical physics [2]. One of the main advantages of the KLJN protocol is that 
it can provide at least the same security as quantum systems at orders of magnitude lower 
cost. Although until now there are only a few real implementations of the system [3,4], 
many potential applications, such as key distribution over Smart Grid [5], uncloneable 
hardware keys [6] or securing computer hardware [7] have been proposed. While several 
attack methods have been discussed [8-13], the debate is still going on concerning the 
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security of the system [14, 15]. Furthermore new, extended protocols have been proposed 
for enhance the security of non-ideal devices [16]. 
The simplified diagram of the communication system is shown on Fig. 1. During the 
key exchange both Alice and Bob randomly select an L or H bit value. Then, they select 
the corresponding resistor (RL and RH) and connect it to the wire. The noise sources, VL(t) 
and VH(t) represent the thermal noise of the resistors. During the communication, the 
voltage and current noise measured in the wire (VE(t) and IE(t)) are determined by the 
selected resistors and can be measured not only by Alice and Bob, but also by the eaves-
dropper, Eve. The security of the system is based on the assumption that even if Eve can 
measure these signals, she cannot differentiate between the LH state and HL state. 
 
Fig. 1. Simplified diagram of the KLJN system (HL state is shown) 
In real applications the thermal noise of resistors is too low therefore voltage noise 
generators are typically used to emulate high enough temperature [13]. It has already 
been stated that the security requires the use of Johnson-like noise, namely the noise must 
have normal distribution and the standard deviance must be scaled as the root of the re-
sistance [2]. We have proven this statement using purely mathematical statistical tools 
[1], and in the present article we will show that these noise properties are not only need-
ed, but also guarantee absolute security against statistical attacks. Note that in this paper 
we do not address protection against attacks based on the analysis of the time dependence 
of the signals. 
2. Results 
Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) show the voltage and current values that can be measured by the 
eavesdropper during the two secure states, LH and HL, respectively. The notation used in 
the equations is introduced in Fig. 1. The communication is secure if Eve cannot distin-
guish between these two states. The voltage and current measured by Eve in the LH state 
can be expressed as: 
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The voltage and current signal measured by Eve in the HL state (corresponding to 
Fig. 1) are given by the following equations: 
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For secure communication, the joint probability density function pLH(IE,VE) and 
pHL(IE,VE) must be the same. If IE and VE are independent, this is satisfied. 
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As it has been proven [17], linear combinations YA and YB of two independent random 
variables X1 and X2 in Eq. (3) will be statistically independent if and only if each random 
variable is normally distributed and Eq. (4) is satisfied: 
 2211 XAXAYA  and 2211 XBXBYB  , (3) 
 02222
2
111   BABA , (4) 
where 1 and 2 are the standard deviations of X1 and X2 respectively. In our case we ob-
tain: 
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where VH and VL are the standard deviations of VHA and VLB, respectively. Note, that we 
get a similar equation for the LH case. According to this, the distribution of VHA and VLB 
must be normal, and the scaling of the standard deviation must follow the rule: 
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in agreement with the results presented in [1]. We have carried out numerical simulations 
[18] to obtain the joint statistics of IE and VE. We have generated 2
13
 samples both for the 
current and voltage and made scatter plots for several cases. Figure 2 demonstrates what 
happens with the joint distribution of IE and VE if Eq. (9) is not satisfied: there is an 
asymmetry in the distribution that depends on the actual state, LH or HL. 
  
Fig. 2. Scatter plot for cases LH (left) and HL (right) using noise with normal distribution if the Eq. (9) is not 
satisfied. RL=1 kΩ, RH=10 kΩ, VH/VL=1,5. 
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Fig. 3. Scatter plot for case HL using distributions with different values of α. Note that α = 1 and α = 2 corre-
spond to Cauchy and normal distribution, respectively. RL=1 kΩ, RH=10 kΩ, wVH/wVL = (RH/RL)
½ 
In order to achieve a secure communication, the linear combination of noises must give 
the same type of probability distribution as the original one [1]. Such distributions are 
called stable distributions; here we consider symmetric α-stable distributions that include 
normal distribution as a special case. Assuming distributions symmetric around zero their 
characteristic function is defined by the following equation: 
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where α is the stability parameter in the range from 0 to 2 and w is the scaling factor of 
the probability density function. Note that α = 2 corresponds to normal distribution and 
α = 1 corresponds to Cauchy distribution. However, according to [17], IE and VE are not 
independent except in the case of normal distribution (α = 2) as can be seen on Fig. 3. 
Note that not all of such distributions have finite variance, therefore the scaling of the 
noise voltages was based on the scaling factor w which can be associated with the voltage 
noise magnitude and is defined in Eq. (10). Thus, the higher and lower noise voltages 
have scaling factors wVH and wVL, respectively. 
Digital implementations of KLJN [3] require numerically generated random numbers. 
Pseudo-random number generators typically provide uniform distribution and generating 
normally distributed numbers is more complicated. However, in agreement with our re-
sults, Fig.4. clearly shows that the scatter plots for LH and HL cases are different for uni-
formly distributed signals, therefore they cannot be used for secure communication. 
  
Fig. 4  Scatter plot for cases LH (left) and HL (right) using noise with uniform distribution. RL=1 kΩ, 
RH=10 kΩ, VH/VL = (RH/RL)
½ 
3. Conclusion 
We have shown that communication using the KLJN protocol is secure if and only if 
noise voltages with normal distribution are used and the variance of the noise voltages 
follow the scaling defined by Eq. (9). This result is based on mathematical statistical der-
ivation and it is in agreement with previous results [1,2]. Note that protection against 
attacks using time and correlation analysis is not considered and can be addressed in sub-
sequent publications. Further analysis can clarify how the time domain properties of the 
noise influence the security of the system. 
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